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Abstract
Yes. We analyze the economic beneﬁt of TreasuryInﬂation Protected Securities (TIPS)
issuance by estimating the inﬂation risk premium that penalizes nominal Treasuries vis-
` a-vis TIPS and the cost derived from TIPS liquidity disadvantage. To account for the
latter, we introduce a novel model-independent range for the liquidity premium in TIPS
exploiting additional information from inﬂation swaps. We also adjust our model estimates
for ﬁnite-sample bias. The resulting measure provides a lower bound to the beneﬁt of
TIPS, which is positive on average. Thus, our analysis suggests that the Treasury could
save billions of dollars by signiﬁcantly expanding its TIPS program.
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In light of the large deﬁcits in recent years and the budgetary outlook for the years ahead,
the question of how the U.S. government should ﬁnance its debt has become a pressing issue.
Such a challenging ﬁscal environment highlights the importance of minimizing the cost of debt
in order to reduce future tax burdens and the related economic ineﬃciencies. Historically,
the U.S. government ﬁnanced its deﬁcits by issuing regular Treasury securities that pay ﬁxed
coupons and a ﬁxed nominal amount at maturity. However, in 1997 the Treasury began issuing
an alternative set of securities known as Treasury Inﬂation Protected Securities (TIPS) that
deliver a real payoﬀ because their principal and coupon payments are adjusted for inﬂation.1
Since its inception, the market for TIPS has grown steadily and, as of the end of 2010, it
represented 7.0 percent of the total market for tradeable U.S. Treasury securities.2
The policy question we address in this paper is straightforward: does the U.S. Treasury
beneﬁt from issuing TIPS instead of regular nominal Treasury securities and, if so, to what
extent? The most direct beneﬁt of issuing TIPS is that the government can avoid paying
the premium on inﬂation uncertainty that investors demand in return for the risk of inﬂation
exceeding its expected path. This inﬂation risk premium tends to push nominal Treasury
yields up relative to TIPS yields, but estimating its level can be complicated due to the
fact that the market for TIPS is smaller and less liquid than the market for Treasuries. As
a result, bond investors require a liquidity premium to compensate them for the greater
frictions to trade they might encounter from trading a less liquid asset during times of market
uncertainty. In order to assess the economic beneﬁt of issuing TIPS, we need to quantify
this tradeoﬀ between the advantage of the inﬂation risk premium and the disadvantage of the
liquidity premium.
We determine the inﬂation risk premium using the dynamic term structure model of
nominal and real Treasury yields developed in Christensen, Lopez, and Rudebusch (2012,
henceforth referred to as the CLR model). This model allows us to decompose the diﬀerence
between the two yield curves—also known as breakeven inﬂation (BEI)—into two components:
bond investors’ expected inﬂation and the associated inﬂation risk premium. The model we
use is a slightly restricted version of the canonical aﬃne term structure models classiﬁed
by Dai and Singleton (2000) and is a well established approach within the empirical term
structure literature to extracting risk premiums from yield curve data.3
1The Treasury uses the change in the headline Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the time when a series
was issued to account for inﬂation compensation.
2According to the Bureau of the Public Debt, the total outstanding notional of TIPS was $616 billion as of
the end of December 2010, which should be compared to $8,863 billion in total marketable Treasury securities.
The data is available at: www.TreasuryDirect.gov
3We provide the basic model details in the paper, but those interested in a more thorough description
should refer to CLR and the related paper by Christensen, Lopez, and Rudebusch (2010).
1In order to account for the TIPS liquidity premium, we use a novel approach that ex-
ploits additional information in the market for inﬂation swaps. Instead of attempting to
estimate the liquidity premium directly, we apply a series of no-arbitrage assumptions about
the pricing of TIPS and inﬂation swaps relative to nominal Treasury bonds. The result is a
model-independent range that allows for any assumption about the size of the TIPS liquid-
ity premium that does not violate the joint pricing information in regular Treasuries, TIPS,
and inﬂation swaps. The fundamental observation underlying our range is that, in a world
without frictions to trade, BEI should equal the inﬂation swap rate. However, in reality, the
observed BEI and inﬂation swap rates are not the same. We attribute the diﬀerence between
the two to non-negative liquidity premiums in both the TIPS and inﬂation swap markets
that reﬂect the distance these markets are from the ideal frictionless outcome.4 In support
of our approach, we ﬁnd that our measure of the sum of TIPS and inﬂation swap liquidity
premiums is highly correlated not only with existing estimates of TIPS liquidity premiums,
but also with measures of liquidity premiums in other ﬁxed-income markets.
This model-independent range allows us to correct TIPS yields for any admissible assump-
tion about the level of TIPS liquidity premiums prior to model estimation. We use the CLR
model to obtain estimates of the inﬂation risk premium at both extremes of the range. At the
lower extreme TIPS yields contain no liquidity premiums and at the upper they contain the
maximum. This produces a range of inﬂation risk premium estimates that maps one-to-one
to any admissible assumption about the level of TIPS liquidity premiums. We also account
for the ﬁnite-sample bias that occurs in the estimates of the model factor dynamics that drive
the BEI decomposition.5
We combine our inﬂation risk and liquidity premium analysis to construct a measure that
provides a quantitative lower bound to the economic beneﬁt of TIPS issuance. In order to
construct our measure, we ﬁrst take the minimum of the estimated range of inﬂation risk
premiums for each observation date and at each maturity. We then deduct the corresponding
maximally admissible TIPS liquidity premium.6 We refer to the resulting measure as the
minimum liquidity-adjusted inﬂation risk premium. The average of our measure is positive
over our sample with means of 5.5 and 10.5 basis points at the ﬁve- and ten-year maturity,
4Note that, due to collateral posting, the credit risk in inﬂation swap contracts is negligible and can be
neglected for pricing purposes. Also, we assume the default risk of the U.S. government to be negligible, which
is warranted for our sample that ends in 2010 well before the downgrade of U.S. Treasury debt in August 2011.
However, even for this later period, any signiﬁcant credit risk premium is not likely to bias an analysis like
ours as it would aﬀect regular Treasury and TIPS yields in the same way, leaving BEI eﬀectively unchanged.
5Bauer, Rudebusch, and Wu (2012) provide a complete discussion of the ﬁnite-sample bias in empirical
aﬃne Gaussian term structure models. Our bias correction represents an adaptation of their approach to
non-Gaussian models.
6We also adjust the result for the fact that the U.S. Treasury issues regular Treasury securities at low,
so-called on-the-run Treasury yields, which diﬀer from the seasoned, or so-called oﬀ-the-run, Treasury yields
we use in model estimation.
2respectively.7 This suggests that the inﬂation risk premium has more than outweighed the
liquidity disadvantage of TIPS on net and that the U.S. Treasury has beneﬁtted from its
TIPS program during our sample period.
To put the cost diﬀerence into perspective, we calculate the savings to the Treasury of
dedicating a larger portion of its debt portfolio to TIPS instead of nominal Treasuries using
our ten-year minimum liquidity-adjusted inﬂation risk premium. We ﬁnd that over the next
ten years at current debt levels the Treasury would save over $24.6 billion if the proportion
of TIPS in its portfolio were increased from the current seven percent to one third. More
realistically, if the debt continues to grow at the rate it has for the past ten years, restructuring
the Treasury’s portfolio to contain one third in TIPS would save $50.7 billion over ten years.
Given the conservative nature of our measure and the fact that increasing the volume of
TIPS would likely reduce their liquidity disadvantage and further increase the net premium
investors are willing to forgo for inﬂation protection, the actual savings could prove to be
substantively higher.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the minimum
liquidity-adjusted inﬂation risk premium and presents our results of assessing the beneﬁt
of TIPS issuance to the U.S. government. Section 3 describes the theory construction of the
admissible range for the liquidity premium in TIPS yields, while Section 4 introduces the
CLR model and our estimation of the inﬂation risk premium penalty of regular Treasuries.
Section 5 concludes the paper. Appendices contain additional technical details.
2 The Beneﬁt of TIPS Issuance to the U.S. Treasury
In this section, we summarize the result of our analysis of the beneﬁt of TIPS issuance to
the U.S. Treasury, while subsequent sections describe the various components that went into
generating the result.
To assess the beneﬁt to the U.S. Treasury of issuing TIPS, we calculate the most con-
servative estimate possible of a liquidity-adjusted inﬂation risk premium based on our bias-
corrected model estimation results. To construct this measure for a given maturity, we ﬁrst
take the minimum for each observation date of the range of inﬂation risk premium estimates
produced by the CLR model while allowing for any admissible TIPS yield liquidity correction.
Second, we deduct the top of our range of admissible TIPS liquidity premiums. A positive dif-
ference at this point implies that even the smallest inﬂation risk premium estimate produced
by the CLR model is larger than the largest feasible TIPS liquidity penalty, independent of
any assumption about the speciﬁc level of the TIPS liquidity premium. We also make a ﬁnal
adjustment for the liquidity diﬀerential between the seasoned Treasury yields we use in the
7Most TIPS issuance takes place at the ﬁve- and ten-year maturities.
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Figure 1: Minimum Liquidity-Adjusted Inﬂation Risk Premiums.
Illustration of the ﬁve- and ten-year minimum liquidity-adjusted inﬂation risk premiums based on the
CLR model.
model estimation and the lower yields of newly issued Treasuries. In order to correct for
this eﬀect, we deduct the spread between oﬀ-the-run and on-the-run Treasury yields of the
same maturity from the diﬀerence above to produce our ﬁnal measure that we refer to as the
minimum liquidity-adjusted inﬂation risk premium shown in Figure 1.
While this liquidity-adjusted measure of the smallest possible inﬂation risk premium is
the most conservative estimate of the cost advantage of TIPS we can generate using the CLR
model, it is still positive for 49.2 and 58.9 percent of the sample at the ﬁve- and ten-year
maturities, respectively. The respective mean values are 5.5 and 10.5 basis points, while the
respective maxima are 93.3 and 93.1 basis points.8 Taken with the fact that, as we will argue
later, the TIPS liquidity premium is likely in the lower half of the admissible range, far below
the value assumed in the calculation of our measure, the actual beneﬁt of TIPS is most likely
higher than the estimate we provide. We believe this is a strong indication that the U.S.
Treasury has beneﬁtted from issuing TIPS for extended periods during this six-year sample.
As an alternative way of illustrating the beneﬁts of TIPS, we attempt to put the cost
savings of TIPS into dollar terms. This requires assumptions about both the amount of
Treasury debt and its composition. Here, we limit the exercise to two simple calculations to
8For robustness, we repeated the analysis using the Gaussian model of nominal and real yields introduced
in Christensen et al. (2010) and obtained similar results. These are available upon request.
4exemplify the potential savings. The ﬁrst scenario we consider is that the total amount of
tradeable Treasury securities remains constant over the next ten years at their level as of the
end of 2010 ($8,863 billion) and that the proportion of TIPS is increased from the current
seven percent to one third.9 Using the average of our ten-year minimum liquidity-adjusted
inﬂation risk premium as the cost saving rate, we ﬁnd that the Treasury would save $24.6
billion over the next ten years. Another scenario is the somewhat more realistic assumption
that the Treasury debt will continue to grow at the rate it has for the past ten years. If we
assume the Treasury restructures its portfolio to contain one third in TIPS, it would lead to a
cost reduction of the order of $50.7 billion dollars over ten years.10 It is also important to note
that these are likely not to be exaggerated numbers. We ﬁrst point to the conservative nature
of our measure that imposes the maximally admissible liquidity penalty on TIPS. Second, the
development of the TIPS market and its liquidity since its inception in 1997 suggests that
increasing the TIPS issuance volume as implied by the envisioned policy change above would
likely reduce their liquidity costs. As a result, TIPS would become even more attractive to
investors and the cost reductions would be even larger.
However, we emphasize that this is a narrow cost-beneﬁt analysis of the tradeoﬀ on any
given day between issuing a nominal or a real bond based on bond investors’ outlook for inﬂa-
tion and their associated premium for being exposed to that risk. Other considerations such
as the overall composition of the Treasury’s liabilities or diﬀerences between the Treasury’s
inﬂation outlook and that of market participants might lead to a diﬀerent conclusion,11 but
such aspects are outside the scope of this paper.
The remainder of the paper is devoted to detailing the components that went into achieving
the result above. In Section 3, we describe our model-independent measure of the liquidity
disadvantage of TIPS, while Section 4 describes our usage of the CLR model to generate
estimates of the inﬂation risk premium penalty of nominal Treasuries.
3 Measuring the Liquidity Premium in TIPS Yields
The existence of TIPS liquidity premiums is well documented. Fleming and Krishnan (2012)
report that the market characteristics of TIPS trading indicate smaller trading volume, longer
turn around time, and wider bid-ask spreads than is normally observed in the nominal Trea-
sury bond market (see also Campbell, Shiller, and Viceira 2009, Dudley, Roush, Steinberg
Ezer 2009, G¨ urkaynak, Sack, and Wright 2010, Sack and Elsasser 2004). However, the degree
9We choose this ratio because it is close to the ratio of real to total government debt that the U.K currently
issues
10This assumes the amount of marketable Treasuries continues to grow for ten years at the average rate
of 13.1 percent, the yearly rate it has averaged from 2001 through 2011. Additionally, the cost comparison
assumes a constant ratio of TIPS of one third versus seven percent.
11We thank Ib Hansen for pointing out this distinction.
5to which they bias TIPS yields remains a topic of debate because attempts to estimate the
TIPS liquidity premium directly have resulted in varying results. D’Amico, Kim, and Wei
(2010, henceforth DKW) estimate the liquidity premium using a latent-factor aﬃne term
structure model of nominal and real Treasury yields. They ﬁnd that the premium was 100
to 200 basis points during the early years of TIPS issuance, but that it has since declined
to average about 50 basis points at the ten-year maturity.12 Pﬂueger and Viceira (2011,
henceforth PV) estimate the TIPS liquidity premium by regressing BEI on several measures
of liquidity in bond markets. Their estimate follows a similar overall pattern to the DKW
estimates, but averages 70 basis points. Both estimates show sharp spikes in the liquidity
premium during the ﬁnancial crisis that exceed 250 basis points.
This liquidity disadvantage of TIPS is the major point of criticism for those who believe
that the TIPS program is ultimately costly for the Treasury. In a recent paper, Fleckenstein,
Longstaﬀ, and Lustig (2010, henceforth FLL) go so far as to claim that the poor liquidity in
the TIPS market has resulted in severe instances of arbitrage that could have otherwise been
avoided if the Treasury had issued nominal debt instead. However, compared to this earlier
research, our assessment is arguably preferable in that we do not have to rely on model-based
estimates of the TIPS liquidity premiums, which have until now been inconsistent across
studies. Our approach is novel in that we use the additional information in inﬂation swap
rates to create a bounded range for the TIPS liquidity premium. Further analysis may provide
insight into the level of the premium, but for the purpose of our cost-beneﬁt analysis, the
range we provide is ideal since it is model-independent. The following sections introduce
the theory, data, and characteristics of the range we use to account for the TIPS liquidity
disadvantage in our assessment.
3.1 The Maximum Range for the Liquidity Correction of TIPS Yields
To begin, we ﬁrst detail our theoretical thinking and the information set that underlie it.
We observe a set of nominal and real Treasury zero-coupon bond yields, which we denote
  yN
t (τ) and   yR
t (τ), respectively, where τ is the number of years to maturity. Also, we observe
a corresponding set of zero-coupon rates on inﬂation swap contracts denoted   ISt(τ). Due
to microstructure frictions, such as bid-ask spreads and discrete-time trading in discrete
denominations, these rates diﬀer from the unobserved values that would prevail in a frictionless
world without any obstacles to continuous trading, which we denote yN
t (τ), yR
t (τ), and ISt(τ),
respectively. Assuming investors are forward looking and utility-maximizing, there should be
no arbitrages in such a world and the resulting asset prices should only reﬂect the underlying
12This ﬁgure excludes the abnormal periods of market illiquidity that occurred early in the series and during
the ﬁnancial crisis. The average is calculated with data beginning in January 2004 after the decline had
ﬂattened out and excludes the crisis period from August 2007 to May 2009.
6economic fundamentals.
Implicit in the usage of the word “premium” (or penalty) is the notion that a clean, unob-
served price would prevail if only some, not necessarily well-identiﬁed, market microstructure
frictions did not bias the prices actually observed. We deﬁne the absolute liquidity premium
as the price diﬀerence between the observed and the unobservable “frictionless” market out-
come of a given asset. As is common in the literature, we only seek to identify the relative
liquidity premium between two comparable assets since it is extremely diﬃcult to identify the
unobservable frictionless price of an asset directly. In this sense the liquidity premiums we
derive represent the total cost of all frictions to trade (wider bid-ask spreads, lower trading
volume, etc.) of the less liquid asset beyond those of the more liquid asset against which it is
being compared.
3.1.1 Three Fundamental Assumptions
In order to derive the bound for the admissible range of liquidity premiums in TIPS yields,
we introduce three fundamental assumptions:
(i). The nominal Treasury yields we observe are very close to the unobservable nominal
yields that would prevail in a frictionless world. Thus, we assume   yN
t (τ) = yN
t (τ) for
all t and all relevant τ. Even if not exactly true (say, for example, during the ﬁnancial
crisis of 2008 and 2009), this is not critical to the analysis as the story is ultimately
about the relative liquidity between securities that pay nominal and real yields.
(ii). TIPS are no more liquid than nominal Treasury bonds. As a consequence, the TIPS
yields we observe contain a time-varying liquidity premium denoted δR
t (τ), which gen-
erates a wedge between the observed TIPS yields and its frictionless counterpart given
by   yR
t (τ) = yR
t (τ) + δR
t (τ) with δR
t (τ) ≥ 0 for all t and all relevant τ.
(iii). Inﬂation swaps are no more liquid than nominal Treasury bonds. As a consequence,
observed inﬂation swap rates can also be diﬀerent from their frictionless counterpart
with the diﬀerence given by   ISt(τ) = ISt(τ) + δIS
t (τ) and δIS
t (τ) ≥ 0 for all t and all
relevant τ.
Provided the above assumptions are valid, there exists an upper bound to the unobservable
liquidity premium in TIPS yields tied to the diﬀerence between observed inﬂation swap and
BEI rates, which we deﬁne as
∆t(τ) ≡   ISt(τ) − [ BEIt(τ) =   ISt(τ) − [  yN
t (τ) −   yR
t (τ)]. (1)
In a world without any frictions to trade, arbitrageurs would chisel away any diﬀerence be-
tween the inﬂation swap rate and breakeven inﬂation. Thus, the frictionless inﬂation swap
7rate must equal the frictionless breakeven inﬂation rate such that ISt(τ) = yN
t (τ)−yR
t (τ) for
all t and all τ.13 By implication, the diﬀerence ∆t(τ) is a measure of how far the observed
market rates are from the frictionless outcome. Using our three assumptions the diﬀerence
can be re-written as
∆t(τ) = ISt(τ) + δIS
t (τ) − [yN
t (τ) − (yR
t (τ) + δR
t (τ))] (2)
= δR
t (τ) + δIS
t (τ) ≥ 0. (3)
This shows that, under our assumptions, the diﬀerence between the observed inﬂation
swap and breakeven inﬂation rates is non-negative and equal to the sum of the liquidity
premium in TIPS and the liquidity premium in inﬂation swaps. Since we assume the liquidity
premiums to be non-negative, the diﬀerence provides a bound on the TIPS liquidity premium:
minδR
t (τ) = 0 and maxδR
t (τ) = ∆t(τ).
At the lower bound, observed TIPS prices contain no liquidity premium because the deviation
from the frictionless market outcome is entirely attributable to liquidity premiums in the
observed inﬂation swap rate. In terms of the notation introduced above, δR
t (τ) = 0 and
δIS
t (τ) = ∆t(τ), implying that the observed TIPS yields are equal to the frictionless real
yields, yR
t (τ) =   yR
t (τ). This extreme represents the assumption implicit in papers like Adrian
and Wu (2010) and CLR where TIPS yields are taken at face value without any correction
for liquidity.
Conversely, at the upper bound, TIPS are priced with the maximum liquidity premium
while inﬂation swap rates carry none. In this case, δR
t (τ) = ∆t(τ) and δIS
t (τ) = 0, meaning
the observed inﬂation swap rates reﬂect the frictionless breakeven rates,   ISt(τ) = ISt(τ),
while   yR
t (τ) = yR
t (τ) + ∆t(τ) or, equivalently, yR
t =   yN
t (τ) −   ISt(τ). Thus, the corrected
frictionless TIPS yields are the observed nominal yields less the observed inﬂation swap rates.
This assumption is implicit in the analysis performed by FLL as all opportunities for arbitrage
documented in that paper are assigned to the market for TIPS rather than the market for
inﬂation swaps. Finally, it should be noted that the continuum in between the two extremes
gives all admissible combinations of δR
t (τ) and δIS
t (τ).
3.1.2 The Liquidity Premium in Inﬂation Swap Rates
We believe our ﬁrst two assumptions are uncontroversial because the market for nominal U.S.
Treasury bonds is one of the most liquid ﬁxed-income markets. In comparison, TIPS are
13In a frictionless world, to buy one nominal zero-coupon bond at t that yields y
N
t (τ) produces the same cash
ﬂow as buying one real zero-coupon bond that yields y
R
t (τ) and going short, at zero cost, a τ-year inﬂation
swap contract with a ﬁxed rate of ISt(τ).










Net receipts [  ISt(τ) − (  yN
t (τ) −   yR
t (τ)) + βN
t (τ) − βR
t (τ)]τ
Table 1: Cash Flow of Investment Strategy that Hedges a Short Position in a
Zero-Coupon Inﬂation Swap Contract.
Illustration of the cash ﬂows involved in the investment strategy that hedges a short position in an
inﬂation swap. It involves: 1) The inﬂation swap position itself. 2) A long asset swap position in the
τ-year zero-coupon TIPS. 3) A short asset swap position in the τ-year zero-coupon Treasury bond.
widely considered to be less liquid. However, the assumption that the observed inﬂation swap
rates are above their ideal frictionless rate is less obvious and merits elaboration.
The mechanics of hedging activity in the inﬂation swap market, as described in Campbell
et al. (2009), suggest that the observed inﬂation swap rate should be marked up from the
unobserved frictionless rate due to the ﬁnancing and transaction costs of replicating cash
ﬂows in related asset swap markets. In practice, there are two strategies for generating the
CPI-linked ﬂoating cash ﬂows in the inﬂation swap contract. The ﬁrst is to buy the TIPS with
the desired maturity. This requires funding and implies receiving cash ﬂows on all coupon
dates of that security, which investors may not ﬁnd to be desirable. The alternative is to
enter into a zero-coupon inﬂation swap of the desired maturity. There are no funding costs
in a zero-coupon inﬂation swap as its value is zero at inception. As a consequence, investors
should be willing to pay an extra premium to avoid such funding costs, which explains why
the inﬂation swap rate can be above BEI in equilibrium. However, the size of the inﬂation
swap rate markup is primarily determined from the supply side. The counter party to the
inﬂation swap (typically a hedge fund or investment bank) generates CPI-linked cash ﬂows
by going long in TIPS and short in nominal Treasury bonds through the asset swap market.
Thus, the markup represents the compensation the counter party requires for assuming the
liquidity risk of multiple transactions on the backside of the contract.
This hedging activity creates a connection between our range for the TIPS liquidity pre-
miums and asset swap rates. In an asset swap, the party long the contract pays LIBOR plus
a spread while receiving the cash ﬂow of a speciﬁc bond without exchange of the principal.
In the inﬂation swap, the party short the contract typically generates CPI-linked cash ﬂows
by making the following set of transactions at time t to hedge the assumed risk:
• A short position in the τ-year zero-coupon inﬂation swap struck at   ISt(τ), that is, the




9• A long asset swap position for the τ-year zero-coupon TIPS, that is, agree to paying
[LIBOR+βR
t (τ)]τ in order to receive the ﬁxed accrued coupon   yR




• A short asset swap position in the τ-year zero-coupon Treasury bond, that is, agree to
paying the nominal Treasury yield   yN
t (τ)τ in order to receive [LIBOR+βN
t (τ)]τ.
Here, βN
t (τ) and βR
t (τ) denote the asset swap spreads for the nominal Treasuries and TIPS,
respectively. As all transactions involve swaps on zero-coupon assets, there is no outlay upon
inception because they all have zero net value and payments are only exchanged at maturity
τ years later. Table 1 summarizes the outlays and receipts from this set of transactions at
maturity. The net receipt to the party short the inﬂation swap is
[  ISt(τ) − (  yN
t (τ) −   yR
t (τ)) + βN
t (τ) − βR
t (τ)]τ ≥ 0. (4)
Note that this strategy is really a hedge as the value on the left-hand side of Equation 4 is
deterministic and set at the inception of the contract. For the leveraged investor to be willing
to participate in the inﬂation swap market this value must be non-negative as indicated. Since
we deﬁned the maximum TIPS liquidity premium by ∆t(τ) =   ISt(τ) − (  yN
t (τ) −   yR
t (τ)), the
inequality in Equation (4) can also be written as
∆t(τ) + βN
t (τ) − βR
t (τ) ≥ 0. (5)
Campbell et al. (2009) note that, normally, the asset swap spreads, βN
t (τ) and βR
t (τ), are
negative and more so for the nominal Treasuries, that is,
βN
t (τ) < βR
t (τ) ≤ 0.15 (6)
Under competitive circumstances (zero cost of entry to the inﬂation swap market etc.), we
expect Equation (5) to hold with equality. Using the inequality in Equation (6), we can then
re-write Equation (5) as
∆t(τ) = βR
t (τ) − βN
t (τ) > 0. (7)
Thus, our maximum range for the TIPS liquidity premium equals the diﬀerence between
the TIPS and nominal Treasury asset swap spreads and is strictly positive. Of course, this
14Here, we are neglecting the value of the deﬂation protection in the TIPS in that the actual payment on
the TIPS asset swap is max[
CPI(t+τ)
CPI(t) − 1,0]. We thank Xiaopeng Zhang for pointing this out. Thus, the
calculations are accurate provided the value of the deﬂation protection for the particular TIPS in the asset
swap is negligible. If not, they can be corrected by calculating its value in a way similar to the one described
in CLR.
15During the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 and 2009, β
R
t (τ) turned positive, but the relative relationship between
β
N
t (τ) and β
R
t (τ) remained as indicated by the ﬁrst inequality.
10idealized calculation is based on zero-coupon bonds, but the diﬀerence between asset swap
spreads on TIPS and regular Treasuries should still provide a good approximation to our
maximum range.
We re-emphasize that, without additional information, any combination of non-negative
δR
t (τ) and δIS
t (τ) that satisﬁes the condition ∆t(τ) = δR
t (τ)+δIS
t (τ) is admissible and cannot
be legitimately excluded ex ante. Also, we underscore that our construction is valid for any
sample of nominal Treasury and real TIPS yields as long as our three key assumptions are
satisﬁed by the data. This observation implies that the size and shape of the range depend
on the underlying pool of bonds, the method used in the yield curve construction etc., but
that the range still represents the admissible band for the TIPS liquidity premium for the
speciﬁc sample under consideration.
3.1.3 Construction and Characteristics of the Range
We use daily estimates of zero-coupon nominal and real Treasury bond yields as constructed
by G¨ urkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007, 2010, henceforth GSW) for our observed bond yields.
For our inﬂation swap rates, we use daily quotes from Bloomberg. The rates we use are
for zero-coupon inﬂation swap contracts, meaning they have no exchange of payment upon
issuance and a single cash ﬂow exchanged at maturity. The quoted rates represent the payment
of the ﬁxed leg at an annual rate, which we convert into continuously compounded rates using
the formula   IS
c
t(τ) = ln(1 +   ISt(τ)) to make them comparable to the other interest rates.
Bloomberg begins reporting quotes on inﬂation swap rates in early 2004, but the data is not
consistently populated until the end of the year. As a result, we begin the sample period on
January 4, 2005 and eliminate the few days during the sample period where quotes are not
available for all maturities, which leaves us with a sample of 1,482 observations.
To construct the admissible range for the TIPS liquidity premium, we calculate zero-
coupon BEI rates at the ﬁve-, six-, seven-, eight-, nine- and ten-year maturities and deduct
them from the inﬂation swap rates of the corresponding maturities to obtain ∆t(τ). We begin
the sample period on January 4, 2005 in order to align the TIPS sample with the inﬂation
swap data resulting in 1,482 observations.16 Figure 2 illustrates the upper bound to the TIPS
liquidity premium at the ﬁve-, seven-, and ten-year maturities, while Table 2 reports the
summary statistics for all six series. Consistent with our theoretical assumptions, the values
of ∆t(τ) are strictly positive for all six maturities. Furthermore, the term structure of the
maximum TIPS liquidity premiums tends to be downward sloping with maturity.
We note that the size and variation of the maximum range do not simply reﬂect bid-ask
spreads of the underlying bonds and inﬂation swap contracts. Figure 3 shows the bid-ask
16For the purpose of consistency and to avoid ﬁltering, we eliminate the nominal and real yields on days
where the inﬂation swap rates are not available.























Maximum five−year TIPS liquidity premium      
Maximum seven−year TIPS liquidity premium      
Maximum ten−year TIPS liquidity premium      
Figure 2: The Maximum TIPS Liquidity Premiums.
Illustration of the diﬀerence between zero-coupon inﬂation swap rates and comparable zero-coupon
BEI rates that constitute the upper bound of the admissible range for TIPS liquidity premiums.
Maturity Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
in months in bps in bps in bps in bps
Skewness Kurtosis
60 44.16 29.11 7.88 209.73 2.62 11.54
72 41.58 24.67 13.49 171.87 2.49 9.93
84 38.56 21.69 10.82 153.81 2.50 9.62
96 35.38 19.17 9.87 138.24 2.56 9.93
108 32.29 18.02 8.55 129.03 2.60 10.58
120 29.90 17.43 1.44 123.97 2.54 10.44
Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Maximum TIPS Liquidity Premiums.
Summary statistics for the sample of diﬀerences between zero-coupon inﬂation swap rates and com-
parable zero-coupon breakeven inﬂation rates covering the period from January 4, 2005 to December
31, 2010, a total of 1,482 daily observations.
spread as reported by Bloomberg for the most recently issued, or so-called on-the-run, ﬁve-
and ten-year TIPS. The average over our sample period is 1.4 basis point for the ﬁve-year
TIPS and 0.7 basis point for the ten-year TIPS, which should be compared to averages of
9.1 and 7.7 basis points for the ﬁve- and ten-year inﬂation swap, respectively. This is of
the order of transaction costs in the inﬂation swap market reported by FLL based on their
conversations with traders. For comparison, Fleming and Mizrach (2009) report the inside
bid-ask spreads for regular Treasuries average one basis point of par at the ten-year maturity.





























Five−year TIPS   
Ten−year TIPS     
Five−year inflation swap  
Ten−year inflation swap      
Figure 3: Bid-Ask Spreads in the TIPS and Inﬂation Swap Markets.
Illustration of the bid-ask spread as reported by Bloomberg for the most recently issued, or so-called on-
the-run, ﬁve- and ten-year TIPS. Shown are also the bid-ask spreads from the inﬂation swap market
for the ﬁve- and ten-year zero-coupon inﬂation swap contracts. All series are smoothed four-week
moving averages and measured in basis points.
This implies even smaller trading costs in terms of yield to maturity, the return comparable
to the inﬂation swap rate. Thus, bid-ask spreads only account for a small fraction of the sum
of liquidity premiums in TIPS and inﬂation swaps that represents our maximum range for
the TIPS liquidity premium.
3.2 Comparison to Other Liquidity Premium Estimates
Our measure of combined liquidity premiums in TIPS yields and inﬂation swap rates is
highly correlated with several other commonly used measures of bond liquidity. Notably, the
ten-year oﬀ-the-run over on-the-run nominal Treasury bond yield diﬀerence and the credit
spread of AAA-Rated U.S. industrial bonds have simple correlation coeﬃcients of 0.67 and
0.73, respectively.17 The former represents the premium investors place on seasoned nominal
treasuries over the highly liquid newly issued series of the same maturity. The latter represents
17The spread between the ten-year oﬀ-the-run Treasury par-coupon bond yield from the GSW (2007)
database and the ten-year Treasury par-coupon bond yield from the H.15 series at the Board of Governors is
compared with the maximum ten-year TIPS liquidity premium. The spread between the one-year AAA-rated
U.S. industrial corporate bond yield and the comparable Treasury yield is compared with the ﬁve-year TIPS
liquidity premium.


































Maximum five−year TIPS liquidity premium     
Five−year TIPS liquidity premium, DKW model      
(a) Five-year maturity.


































Maximum ten−year TIPS liquidity premium     
Ten−year TIPS liquidity premium, DKW model      
(b) Ten-year maturity.
Figure 4: Comparison to the TIPS Liquidity Premiums from the DKW Model.
Comparison of the model-independent maximum for the admissible liquidity premium in TIPS yields
to the estimated TIPS liquidity premiums from the DKW model.
the liquidity advantage of government bonds over corporate bonds that contain negligible
credit risk. These comparisons are meant to illustrate that more general variation in bond
market liquidity is apparent in our maximum range.
We also compare our measure to the TIPS liquidity premiums estimated in DKW and
PV. DKW estimate the liquidity premium in TIPS yields by constructing a joint model of
nominal and real Treasury yields and CPI inﬂation and including a TIPS-speciﬁc factor in
order to capture the liquidity disadvantage of TIPS yields explicitly. Figure 4 illustrates the
ﬁve- and ten-year DKW TIPS liquidity premium series and compares them to our maximum
range for the admissible ﬁve- and ten-year TIPS liquidity premiums. The DKW estimate
and the maximum range are highly correlated, with correlation coeﬃcients of 0.86 and 0.77
at the ﬁve- and ten-year maturities, respectively. While this suggests that both measures are
capturing similar variation in the market yields, the magnitude of the DKW estimate is not
consistent with the maximum of the admissible range.
At the ﬁve-year maturity, the DKW TIPS liquidity premium is above our maximum for
about half of the sample period, and at the ten-year maturity their estimate is systematically
outside the range. This might result from the fact that DKW attributes all variation in the
TIPS-speciﬁc factor they identify to liquidity eﬀects, leading to excessively large estimates of
the TIPS liquidity premium. The impact this overstatement of the liquidity premium has on
the decomposition of BEI rates is not entirely clear for the inﬂation risk premium. However,
results from our CLR model exercise to be discussed later suggest that the DKW estimation





























Maximum ten−year TIPS liquidity premium     
Ten−year TIPS liquidity premium from PV (2011)      
Figure 5: Comparison to the TIPS Liquidity Premium from PV.
Comparison of the model-independent maximum for the admissible liquidity premium in the ten-year
TIPS yield to the estimated ten-year TIPS liquidity premium from PV.
of expected inﬂation may be too high because the DKW model overcorrects TIPS yields for
liquidity diﬀerentials. Finally, it is worth noting that DKW are not likely to disagree with
the fundamental assumptions that produce our model-independent maximum range because
their approach relies on the same intuition, namely that TIPS are less liquid than nominal
Treasuries, and they use the same GSW nominal and real Treasury yields.
PV take a diﬀerent approach to estimating TIPS liquidity premiums in that they regress
BEI on several measures of bond liquidity (including the oﬀ- over the on-the-run yield spread
discussed previously) to generate estimates of the liquidity premium diﬀerential between TIPS
and nominal yields. Figure 5 compares our maximum range for the ten-year TIPS liquidity
premium to their estimated ten-year TIPS liquidity premium for the overlapping sample
period.18 The level of their liquidity premium is well above the maximum range, but they
share a very high correlation. This suggests that, while regression-based estimates of liquidity
premiums using economic fundamentals can be oﬀ in terms of the level of the premium, they
may capture the time variation reasonably well.19 As was the case for DKW, we emphasize
that the analysis in PV is based on BEI rates from the same GSW databases used in the
18We are very thankful to Luis Viceira for sharing their data.
19Technically, this requires the additional assumption that the actual, unobserved TIPS liquidity premium
located inside the range be highly correlated with the maximum of the range used in the comparison here.
15construction of our upper bound for the TIPS liquidity premium. Hence, their estimated
liquidity premium is comparable to our range.
To summarize, the information in nominal Treasury and real TIPS yields can be used in
junction with inﬂation swap rates to derive a model-independent range for the admissible size
of TIPS liquidity premiums. The constructed range relies on two assumptions, namely that
TIPS and inﬂation swap contracts are each less liquid than nominal Treasuries, which we think
are widely accepted and well documented in the literature. Furthermore, the range is highly
correlated with existing estimates of TIPS liquidity premiums. Thus, with an upper bound
for the liquidity disadvantage of TIPS in place, we can turn our attention to the beneﬁt of
TIPS, i.e., the saved inﬂation risk premiums. We address this subject in the following section.
4 Measuring the Inﬂation Risk Premium in Nominal Yields
While we use a model-independent measure of the liquidity eﬀects in TIPS yields because
researchers have yet to arrive to a consensus on their size, the practice of empirically extracting
inﬂation risk premiums from breakeven inﬂation using term structure models is much more
established within the bond pricing literature. To that end, we employ the model introduced
in CLR, but use it in a novel fashion to exploit the information in the model-independent
maximum range for the TIPS liquidity premium described in the previous section.
To begin the analysis, we ﬁrst provide a brief theoretical discussion of how an arbitrage-
free term structure model of nominal and real yields can decompose the diﬀerence between
the two into inﬂation expectations and inﬂation risk premiums, where the latter is the excess
yield a nominal bond has to pay for not providing inﬂation protection. We then describe the
model introduced in CLR before proceeding to the empirical results.
4.1 Decomposing Breakeven Inﬂation
To begin, let the nominal and real stochastic discount factors be denoted by MN
t and MR
t ,
respectively. The requirement of no arbitrage enforces a consistency of pricing for any security
over time. Speciﬁcally, the price of a nominal bond that pays one dollar at time t+τ and the
price of a real bond that pays one unit of the consumption basket at time t + τ must satisfy
PN


















Given their payment structure, the no-arbitrage condition also requires a consistency between
the prices of nominal and real bonds such that the price of the consumption basket, denoted


















t , where rN
t and rR
t are
the instantaneous, risk-free nominal and real rates of return, respectively, and Γt is a vector
of premiums on the risks represented by WP
t . Then, by Ito’s lemma, dΠt = (rN
t − rR
t )Πtdt.
Thus, with the absence of arbitrage, the instantaneous growth rate of the price level is equal
to the diﬀerence between the instantaneous nominal and real risk-free rates. Now, it easily






The relationship between the yields and inﬂation expectations can be obtained by decom-
posing the price of the nominal bond as follows:
PN























































































Converting this price into a yield-to-maturity using
yN




t (τ) and yR





the connection between nominal and real zero-coupon yields and expected inﬂation can be
readily expressed as
yN
t (τ) = yR
t (τ) + πe
t(τ) + φt(τ), (11)

























20Appendix A explains how the expected inﬂation is calculated within the CLR model.

































This last equation highlights that the inﬂation risk premium can be positive or negative. It













That is, the riskiness of nominal bonds relative to real bonds depends on the covariance
between the real stochastic discount factor and inﬂation and is ultimately determined by
investor preferences, but for our analysis we will not need to specify those.
4.2 The CLR Model of Nominal and Real Yields
As is clear from the theoretical section above, the market-implied expected inﬂation and the
associated risk premium is measured by modeling the instantaneous nominal and real rates,
rN
t and rR
t . The model we use for that purpose was ﬁrst introduced in CLR and is centered
around the arbitrage-free Nelson-Siegel (AFNS) model framework derived in Christensen,
Diebold, and Rudebusch (2011), but modiﬁed to allow for stochastic yield volatility. The four





t represent level eﬀects in the nominal and real yield curves, respectively, while St and
Ct represent slope and curvature eﬀects common to both yield curves. The instantaneous
nominal and real risk-free rates are deﬁned by:
rN
t = LN
t + St, (15)
rR
t = LR
t + αRSt. (16)
The diﬀerential scaling of real rates to the common slope (and indirectly the common
curvature) factor is captured by the parameter αR. To preserve the Nelson-Siegel factor
loading structure in the nominal and real yield functions, the dynamics of the state variables
under the pricing, or risk-neutral, probability measure (traditionally referred to as the Q-

























LN 0 0 0
0 λ −λ 0
0 0 λ 0




























































σ11 0 0 0
0 σ22 0 0
0 0 σ33 0




















































This structure implies that nominal yields are22,23
yN


























while real yields are given by
yR


























To link the risk-neutral and real-world dynamics of the state variables, we use the extended
aﬃne risk premium speciﬁcation introduced by Cheridito, Filipovi´ c, and Kimmel (2007). The

































































































σ11 0 0 0
0 σ22 0 0
0 0 σ33 0

























































To keep the model arbitrage-free, the two level factors must be prevented from hitting the
lower zero-boundary. This positivity requirement is ensured by imposing the Feller condition
21We follow CLR and limit our focus to speciﬁcations with a diagonal Σ volatility matrix.


























are provided in CLR.





−7 to get a close approximation to the
uniform level factor loading in the original Gaussian AFNS model.






























Furthermore, to have well-deﬁned processes for LN
t and LR
t , the sign of the eﬀect that these
two factors have on each other must be positive, which requires the restrictions that
κP
14 ≤ 0 and κP
41 ≤ 0.
These conditions ensure that the two square-root processes will be non-negatively correlated.
Finally, the model is estimated with the standard Kalman ﬁlter, see CLR for details.
4.3 Model Speciﬁcation and Parameter Sensitivity
Our model application exercise follows CLR and uses nominal yields with three-month, six-
month, one-, two-, three-, ﬁve-, seven-, and ten-year maturities and the six real yields with
ﬁve- to ten-year maturities. For the nominal yields, we use a sample period from January 3,
1995 to December 31, 2010 with a total of 3,972 observations. For the real yields, the sample
begins on January 4, 2005 so that it aligns the TIPS sample with the inﬂation swap data,
resulting in 1,482 observations.
We use the admissible range for the TIPS liquidity premium derived in Section 3 to correct
for the liquidity eﬀects in TIPS yields prior to model estimation. This allows us to study the
sensitivity of the CLR model output to the assumed level of the TIPS liquidity premium. The
bound provided by the admissible range of TIPS liquidity premiums converts into a range of
admissible estimates for the output produced by the model. Thus, this exercise is telling of
the relationship between TIPS liquidity premiums and the BEI decomposition as captured
through the lens of the model. Since the speciﬁcation of the P-dynamics is an important
element in determining a model’s decomposition of BEI rates into inﬂation expectations and
associated risk premiums, we conduct a careful evaluation of various model speciﬁcations.
We start the model selection from the unrestricted speciﬁcation of the mean-reversion
matrix KP, and pare down this matrix using a general-to-speciﬁc strategy that restricts the
least signiﬁcant parameter (as measured by the ratio of the parameter value to its standard
error) to zero and then re-estimate the model. This strategy of eliminating the least signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients continues to the most parsimonious speciﬁcation, which has a diagonal KP matrix.
In order to select our preferred speciﬁcation, we use the Bayes information criterion, which
is commonly used for model selection and is deﬁned as BIC = −2logL + k logT, where T is
the number of data observations (see e.g., Harvey 1989).24
24We have 3,972 nominal yield and 1,482 real yield daily observations. We interpret T as referring to the
longest data series and ﬁx it at 3,972.
20The ﬁrst case we consider assumes that there are no liquidity premiums priced into TIPS
yields. In this case we use the GSW yields without any corrections, which is implicitly assumed
in papers like Adrian and Wu (2010) and CLR. We then evaluate the model speciﬁcation
assuming that there are no liquidity risk premiums in the inﬂation swap rates. That is, the
model estimations are performed on TIPS yields that have been maximally corrected for
liquidity diﬀerentials as described in Section 3. The preferred speciﬁcation according to the























This matrix is identical to the speciﬁcation preferred in CLR.25
Most parameter estimates and corresponding standard deviations for the P-dynamics are
practically indistinguishable and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across the two assumptions about
the size of TIPS liquidity premiums, except for a markedly higher estimated value of κP
44 when
TIPS are assumed subject to the maximum liquidity premium. This suggests a very limited
impact on the estimated P-dynamics of correcting for TIPS liquidity premiums. The most
notable diﬀerence relates to the estimated Q-dynamics where the estimated value of αR is
raised from 0.3860 to 0.5890 in response to a lower estimated path for LR
t as TIPS yields are
lower when maximally corrected for liquidity premiums. As a consequence, the variation of the
common slope and curvature factors plays a bigger role for real TIPS yields in this case, which
ultimately aﬀects the model’s decomposition of BEI into expected inﬂation and inﬂation risk
premiums as we will see later. Finally, Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the ﬁtted
errors across maturities based on the two estimations and provides further documentation of
the accuracy of the model under either assumption.26
4.4 Finite-sample Bias Correction
The main limitation of the model results discussed so far is one that generally plagues the
estimation of any dynamic term structure model. Because interest rates are highly persistent,
empirical autoregressive models, including dynamic term structure models like ours, suﬀer
from potentially substantial ﬁnite-sample estimation bias. Speciﬁcally, model estimates will
generally be biased toward a dynamic system that displays much less persistence than the
25The full details of the speciﬁcation evaluations and the estimated preferred speciﬁcation under both the
zero and maximum TIPS liquidity premium assumptions are provided in Appendix B.
26As expected, the ﬁt of the nominal yields is practically identical and the dispersion in the ﬁt of the real
yields is of modest magnitude.
21Maturity No TIPS Maximum TIPS
in months liquidity premium liquidity premium
Nom. yields Mean RMSE   σε(τi) Mean RMSE   σε(τi)
3 0.81 19.58 19.57 0.59 19.59 19.58
6 -0.12 8.25 8.25 -0.24 8.26 8.25
12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
24 0.44 1.54 1.54 0.48 1.55 1.55
36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
60 -0.27 1.28 1.34 -0.30 1.31 1.38
84 0.21 0.69 1.05 0.25 0.81 1.15
120 -1.26 4.51 4.65 -1.20 4.52 4.66
TIPS yields Mean RMSE   σε(τi) Mean RMSE   σε(τi)
60 -0.88 17.93 17.98 -0.17 14.81 14.95
72 -0.05 10.70 10.77 -0.14 8.61 8.85
84 0.30 4.90 5.04 0.08 3.82 4.36
96 0.09 0.60 1.31 0.16 2.59 3.27
108 -0.67 4.26 4.40 -0.18 5.77 5.98
120 -1.96 8.01 8.09 -1.54 9.63 9.67
Max logL 253,073.70 252,343.70
Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Fitted Errors.
The mean ﬁtted errors, the root mean squared ﬁtted errors (RMSE), and the estimated ﬁtted error
standard deviations from the preferred speciﬁcation of the CLR model of nominal and real yields
are shown with the minimum and the maximum liquidity correction of TIPS yields prior to model
estimation. All numbers are measured in basis points. The nominal yields cover the period from
January 3, 1995, to December 31, 2010, while the real TIPS yields cover the period from January 4,
2005, to December 31, 2010.
true process (so estimates of the real-world mean-reversion matrix, KP, are upward biased).
In our context of decomposing BEI into expected inﬂation and the associated inﬂation risk
premium, such bias tends to imply that the expected inﬂation is too stable and the inﬂation
risk premium too volatile. For our sample period, which is dominated by the ﬁnancial crisis
of 2008-2009 and the ensuing low inﬂation outcomes from sharp declines in energy prices, the
upward bias manifests itself as excessively high estimates of the expected inﬂation component
of BEI and corresponding excessively low estimates of the inﬂation risk premium. This could
lead to serious bias in the assessment of the beneﬁt of issuing TIPS versus regular Treasury
securities. For these reasons a correction for the ﬁnite-sample bias is critical to our analysis.
In a recent paper, Bauer, Rudebusch, and Wu (2012) provide a complete discussion of the
ﬁnite-sample bias in empirical aﬃne Gaussian term structure models. However, as our model
is non-Gaussian, we cannot follow their exact procedure as it relies on the ability to rapidly
estimate the model, which is feasible for aﬃne Gaussian term structure models due to the work
of Joslin, Singleton, and Zhu (2011) and Hamilton and Wu (2012), but not for non-Gaussian





















No TIPS liquidity premium      
No TIPS liquidity premium, bias corrected      
Maximum TIPS liquidity premium      
Maximum TIPS liquidity premium, bias corrected      
(a) Inﬂation expectations.
























No TIPS liquidity premium      
No TIPS liquidity premium, bias corrected      
Maximum TIPS liquidity premium      
Maximum TIPS liquidity premium, bias corrected      
(b) Inﬂation risk premiums.
Figure 6: Range of Ten-Year Inﬂation Expectations and Risk Premiums due to
TIPS Yield Liquidity Corrections.
Illustration of the range of viable ten-year inﬂation expectations and associated inﬂation risk premiums
due to TIPS yield liquidity corrections based on the CLR model with and without correction for the
parameter estimation ﬁnite-sample bias. In each chart, the black lines represent the case with no
TIPS liquidity premiums, while the grey lines represent the reverse case where TIPS yields contain
the maximum liquidity premium.
models like ours as the underlying statistical limit results do not apply. Instead, we make
an adaptation of the approach of Bauer et al. (2012) to non-Gaussian models that preserves
their median-based bias correction, but relies on a parameter-by-parameter adjustment.27
4.5 Estimates of Inﬂation Expectations and Risk Premiums
In this section we analyze the impact the assumed level of the liquidity premium in TIPS
yields has on the CLR model decomposition of BEI rates into expected inﬂation and the
associated risk premium. We also illustrate the eﬀect on the decomposition from the bias
correction.
Figure 6(a) shows the wedge of the expected inﬂation obtained from the two extreme cases
in the assumed level of the TIPS liquidity premium, both with and without bias correction.28
We note the signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the estimates of the expected inﬂation component
27The full details of the bias correction are provided in Appendix C along with the complete table of the
bias-corrected parameters under both assumptions about the size of TIPS liquidity premiums.
28In order to correct each estimate, we ﬁrst use the bias-corrected parameter set along with the observed
yield data as input into the Kalman ﬁlter to obtain the corresponding ﬁltered factor paths. In a second step,
the expected inﬂation is calculated as described in Appendix A and deducted from the ﬁtted BEI (diﬀerence
between ﬁtted nominal and real yields) from the Kalman ﬁlter to produce the bias-corrected estimates of the
inﬂation risk premium.
23from the bias correction. Since the inﬂation risk premium is determined as a residual by de-
ducting the expected inﬂation from BEI, there is a similar eﬀect of the bias correction on the
estimated inﬂation risk premiums, but with the opposite sign as shown in Figure 6(b). This
underscores the importance of addressing the ﬁnite-sample bias in the parameter estimation
when it comes to assessing the beneﬁt of TIPS issuance over issuing regular Treasury securi-
ties. Second, we note the large diﬀerence in the estimates of the expected inﬂation when we
move from the case with no liquidity correction of TIPS yields before estimation to the case
with a maximum correction for TIPS liquidity premiums. The latter case produces estimates
that are systematically higher as BEI is larger under that assumption.
For the range of estimated ten-year inﬂation risk premiums shown in Figure 6(b), we note
that the diﬀerences are typically much smaller and with no systematic sign, indicating that
the assumed level of the TIPS liquidity premium has a much smaller eﬀect on estimates of the
inﬂation risk premium. Also worth noting are the occasional simultaneously negative values
in both series, suggesting that inﬂation risk premiums can be negative even when TIPS yields
are maximally corrected for liquidity premiums.29 Theoretically, a number of circumstances
could lead to this result. One possibility is that the CPI ﬁgure used in the indexation of TIPS
tends to overstate the true inﬂation because substitution eﬀects are not adequately accounted
for. Another explanation is that the marginal investor who determines the tradeoﬀ between
nominal and real yields might have a personal price index diﬀerent from headline CPI. If so,
TIPS only provide a partial hedge for inﬂation risk and, as a result, the investor demands a
premium for being exposed to an imperfect hedge. In both cases, TIPS yields can be higher
than they otherwise might be absent such risk eﬀects. Assuming inﬂation expectations do
not change, which is reasonable as such risk eﬀects should not alter investors’ outlook for
inﬂation, this would result in negative estimates for the inﬂation risk premiums.
To recapitulate the construction of the minimum liquidity-adjusted inﬂation risk premium
shown in Figure 1, we ﬁrst take the minimum of the estimated range of inﬂation risk premi-
ums (shown in Figure 6(b) for the ten-year maturity) for each observation date and at each
maturity. We then deduct the corresponding maximally admissible TIPS liquidity premium
introduced in Section 3. Lastly, we adjust the result for the fact that the U.S. Treasury
issues regular Treasury securities at low, so-called on-the-run Treasury yields, which diﬀer
from the seasoned, or so-called oﬀ-the-run, Treasury yields we use in model estimation. The
ﬁnal series represent the most conservative assessment of the economic beneﬁt of TIPS over
nominal Treasuries that our approach allows us to generate. Despite its conservative nature,
the measure is still positive on average over our sample. This suggests that the U.S. Treasury
could reduce its debt servicing costs by increasing its TIPS program. Our own calculation
29Chernov and Mueller (2011) also report occasional negative inﬂation risk premium estimates in the most
recent part of their sample that covers the 1971-2008 period.
24assuming a constant debt level and an increase in the ratio of TIPS to one third showed that
savings of the order of $24 billion over the next ten years could be obtained by such a shift
in debt management policy.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a measure we refer to as the minimum liquidity-adjusted inﬂation
risk premium in order to quantitatively assess the economic beneﬁt to the U.S. Treasury of
issuing TIPS. It is constructed by taking the smallest inﬂation risk premiums produced by
the CLR model and subtracting the maximum admissible TIPS liquidity premium in addition
to the on-the-run premium for nominal Treasury bonds. The measure itself is conservative
in nature, yet it still indicates that the U.S. Treasury has beneﬁtted from issuing TIPS since
the beginning of our sample period in 2005. Provided other considerations are secondary, our
cost-beneﬁt analysis suggests that the U.S. Treasury could save billions of tax payer dollars
over the next ten years by expanding its issuance of TIPS relative to nominal Treasuries.
To assess the costs of issuing TIPS, which is their liquidity disadvantage relative to regular
Treasury securities, we introduce a model-independent maximum range for the admissible
liquidity premium in TIPS using the joint pricing information in the markets for nominal
Treasury securities, TIPS, and inﬂation swaps. The theoretical assumptions we make in
constructing the range are simple, realistic, and consistent with ﬁndings from studies on the
microstructure of these three markets. Furthermore, the range is highly correlated with other
widely accepted proxies of bond liquidity.
As a consensus on the precise level of the TIPS liquidity premium has yet to develop,
the range also provides a means by which current and future models may be assessed. To
exemplify, we compare the range to the TIPS liquidity premiums estimated in DKW and PV
and ﬁnd the levels of their estimates to be largely outside the admissible range. The strategies
employed by DKW and PV seem to be problematic. By attributing variation in TIPS yields
largely to liquidity, they overestimate its role in the pricing of TIPS yields. Thus for the
purpose of our cost-beneﬁt assessment, our maximum range is ideal since it does not depend
on model-generated results.
To assess the beneﬁts of TIPS, which is the inﬂation risk premium that nominal Trea-
suries are penalized with for not providing inﬂation protection, we use the CLR model of
nominal and real yields. We follow the most recent literature and adjust the estimated model
parameters for ﬁnite-sample bias. We also demonstrate the sensitivity of the CLR model
decomposition of BEI to variations in the TIPS liquidity correction by estimating the model
at both extremes of the maximum range for the TIPS liquidity premium. This exercise can
be done with any term structure model to assess its robustness under diﬀerent assumptions
25about liquidity eﬀects in TIPS pricing.
Our analysis provides insight into the economic costs and beneﬁts of the U.S. Treasury’s
TIPS issuance with the most concrete result being that it is very likely that the U.S. Treasury
gets a cost reduction in the form of saved inﬂation risk premiums from TIPS that surpasses
the liquidity penalty investors price into their rates. We roughly calculate that these savings
could be augmented by tens of billions of dollars if the Treasury were to allocate a larger
portion of its portfolio to TIPS over the next ten years and, given the conservative nature of
the assumptions in the construction of our metric, these ﬁgures likely understate the beneﬁt
of issuing TIPS.
26Appendices
A). Calculation of the Expected Inﬂation and the Inﬂation Risk Premium
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and the boundary condition is B
π(T,T) = 0, while A




























P, and Σ reﬂect the P-dynamics of the state variables. Now, the ODEs above are solved with a
standard fourth order Runge-Kutta method.
By Equation (11), we can easily calculate the inﬂation risk premiums, once we have the corresponding
expected inﬂation, π
e
t(τ), and the ﬁtted nominal and real yields from Equations (17) and (18), respectively.
B). Model Speciﬁcation Evaluation
We start the model selection from the unrestricted speciﬁcation of the mean-reversion matrix K
P, which
provides the maximally admissible ﬂexibility in ﬁtting the data given our restrictions on the state variable
volatility structure. We then pare down this matrix using a general-to-speciﬁc strategy that restricts the least
signiﬁcant parameter (as measured by the ratio of the parameter value to its standard error) to zero and then
re-estimate the model. This strategy of eliminating the least signiﬁcant coeﬃcients continues to the most
parsimonious speciﬁcation, which has a diagonal K
P matrix.
Each estimated speciﬁcation is listed with its maximum log likelihood, its number of estimated parameters
(k), and the p-value from a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that it diﬀers from the speciﬁcation with
30In the equation above, δ
j denotes the jth row of δ.
27Alternative Goodness-of-ﬁt statistics
speciﬁcations Max logL k p-value BIC
(1) Unrestricted KP 253,078.4 38 n.a. -505,841.9
(2) κP
14 = 0 253,078.4 37 1.0000 -505,850.2
(3) κP
14 = κP




24 = 0 253,077.9 35 0.3173 -505,865.8
(5) κP
14 = ... = κP
32 = 0 253,076.5 34 0.0943 -505,871.2
(6) κP
14 = ... = κP
31 = 0 253,076.3 33 0.5271 -505,879.1
(7) κP
14 = ... = κP
21 = 0 253,074.4 32 0.0513 -505,883.6
(8) κP
14 = ... = κP
34 = 0 253,073.7 31 0.2367 -505,890.5
(9) κP
14 = ... = κP
23 = 0 253,067.3 30 0.0003 -505,886.0
Table 4: Evaluation of Alternative Speciﬁcations of the CLR Model With No TIPS
Liquidity Premiums.
Nine alternative estimated speciﬁcations of the CLR model of nominal and real Treasury bond yields
are evaluated assuming no liquidity premiums in TIPS yields. Each speciﬁcation is listed with its
maximum log likelihood (Max logL), number of parameters (k), the p-value from a likelihood ratio
test of the hypothesis that the speciﬁcation diﬀers from the one directly above that has one more free
parameter. The Bayes information criterion (BIC) is also reported, and its minimum value is given in
boldface.
one more parameter—that is, comparing speciﬁcation (s) with speciﬁcation (s − 1). We also report the Bayes
information criterion commonly used for model selection, which is deﬁned as BIC = −2logL + k logT, where
T is the number of data observations (see e.g., Harvey 1989).
31
We start with the case where it is assumed that there are no liquidity premiums priced into TIPS yields.
In that case we use the GSW yields without any corrections in the model estimation. The result of the model































This is identical to the speciﬁcation preferred in CLR. Table 5 contains the estimated parameters in this case.
In Table 6 we evaluate various model speciﬁcations assuming that there are no liquidity risk premiums in
the inﬂation swap rates, that is, the model estimations are performed on TIPS yields that have been maximally
corrected for liquidity diﬀerentials as described in Section 3. Under this assumption, the preferred speciﬁcation































Table 7 contains the estimated parameters in this case.
31We have 3,972 nominal yield and 1,482 real yield daily observations. We interpret T as referring to the





 ,4 θP Σ
KP
1,  1.0188 0 0 0 0.0421 σ11 0.0634
(0.2481) (0.0035) (0.0003)
KP
2,  0 0.6073 -0.5678 0 -0.0110 σ22 0.0126
(0.1610) (0.1285) (0.0131) (0.0001)
KP
3,  0 0 0.7530 0 -0.0065 σ33 0.0315
(0.2168) (0.0114) (0.0004)
KP
4,  0 0 0 1.4246 0.0148 σ44 0.0554
(0.2281) (0.0017) (0.0004)
Table 5: Parameter Estimates for the Preferred Speciﬁcation of the CLR Model
With No TIPS Liquidity Premiums.
The estimated parameters of the KP matrix, θP vector, and diagonal Σ matrix are shown for the
preferred speciﬁcation of the CLR model when there are no liquidity premiums in TIPS yields. The





LR = 15,368 (32.50). The numbers in parentheses are the estimated parameter standard
deviations. The maximum log likelihood value is 253,073.70.
Alternative Goodness-of-ﬁt statistics
speciﬁcations Max logL k p-value BIC
(1) Unrestricted KP 252,354.8 38 n.a. -504,394.7
(2) κP
24 = 0 252,354.7 37 0.6547 -504,402.8
(3) κP
24 = κP




41 = 0 252,351.3 35 0.5271 -504,412.6
(5) κP
24 = ... = κP
21 = 0 252,349.6 34 0.0652 -504,417.4
(6) κP
24 = ... = κP
14 = 0 252,348.8 33 0.2059 -504,424.1
(7) κP
24 = ... = κP
31 = 0 252,346.9 32 0.0513 -504,428.6
(8) κP
24 = ... = κP
34 = 0 252,343.7 31 0.0114 -504,430.5
(9) κP
24 = ... = κP
32 = 0 252,337.1 30 0.0003 -504,425.6
Table 6: Evaluation of Alternative Speciﬁcations of the CLR Model With the
Maximum TIPS Liquidity Premiums.
Nine alternative estimated speciﬁcations of the CLR model of nominal and real Treasury bond yields
are evaluated for the case when TIPS yields are assumed to contain the maximum liquidity premium.
Each speciﬁcation is listed with its maximum log likelihood (Max logL), number of parameters (k), the
p-value from a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that the speciﬁcation diﬀers from the one directly
above that has one more free parameter. The Bayes information criterion (BIC) is also reported, and
its minimum value is given in boldface.
C). The Simulations-Based Finite-Sample Bias Correction
In this appendix, we detail the classic parametric bootstrap simulation exercise we use to correct for the
ﬁnite-sample bias of the parameter estimates in the CLR model. As in the model estimation, we consider
both extremes: (1) Assuming no TIPS liquidity premiums and (2) assuming the maximally admissible TIPS
liquidity premium.
To begin the exercise, we consider the model parameters estimated as of December 31, 2010 and reported





 ,4 θP Σ
KP
1,  0.8707 0 0 0 0.0436 σ11 0.0573
(0.2257) (0.0036) (0.0003)
KP
2,  0 0.5858 -0.5610 0 -0.0124 σ22 0.0122
(0.1857) (0.1351) (0.0136) (0.0001)
KP
3,  0 0 0.7531 0 -0.0074 σ33 0.0320
(0.1681) (0.0117) (0.0003)
KP
4,  0 0 0 2.1022 0.0129 σ44 0.0609
(0.2299) (0.0011) (0.0003)
Table 7: Parameter Estimates for the Preferred Speciﬁcation of the CLR Model
With the Maximum TIPS Liquidity Premiums.
The estimated parameters of the KP matrix, θP vector, and diagonal Σ matrix are shown for the
preferred speciﬁcation of the CLR model when TIPS yields are assumed to contain the maximum
liquidity premium. The Q-related parameters are estimated at: λ = 0.5937 (0.0010), αR = 0.5890
(0.0030), θ
Q
LN = 30,120 (18.48), and θ
Q
LR = 18,559 (32.37). The numbers in parentheses are the
estimated parameter standard deviations. The maximum log likelihood value is 252,343.70.
simulate N = 100 artiﬁcial data sets identical to the actual sample of nominal and real U.S. Treasury yields.
Speciﬁcally, (i) the number of observation dates and the time in between observations are identical to the
original sample, (ii) the yield maturities on each observation date are identical to those in the original sample,
and (iii) i.i.d. errors are added with a maturity-speciﬁc standard deviation given by the estimated values of
σε(τ) from the original sample (reported in the third and sixth column of Table 3, respectively). Third, we
use the N = 100 artiﬁcial data samples as input into the original Kalman ﬁlter estimation, whereby we obtain
N = 100 alternative optimal parameter sets. Importantly, if the model is true, these alternative parameter
sets are each statistically just as likely as the “true” parameter set we got from the original data set. Thus,
for each parameter, we can rank the estimated values and take out the median. It is worth noting that this
approach implicitly handles any correlation there might be between various parameter estimates, in particular
joint outliers naturally occur.
The details of the simulation of the factor paths are provided in the following. The continuous-time
P-dynamics are, in general, given by
dXt = K
P(θ
P − Xt)dt + ΣD(Xt)dW
P
t .
For both restricted square-root processes and unconstrained processes we approximate the continuous-time
process using the Euler approximation.
















































We ﬁx ∆t at a uniform value of 0.0001, which is equivalent to approximately 27 shocks to the X
i
t-process via
the Brownian motion per day. As Feller conditions and other non-negativity requirements are imposed in the
estimations performed with the observed bond yields, the parameter sets used in the simulations naturally sat-






Estimate Median Value Median Value Median Value Median
κ
P
11 1.0188 1.2712 0.7664 0.9441 0.8412 1.0865 0.7735 1.0748
κ
P
22 0.6073 0.7498 0.4648 0.5745 0.4976 0.6033 0.5016 0.6076
κ
P
23 -0.5678 -0.6007 -0.5348 -0.5871 -0.5155 -0.5377 -0.5456 -0.5919
κ
P
33 0.7530 1.0178 0.4883 0.6139 0.6273 0.8132 0.5672 0.7958
κ
P
44 1.4246 1.9298 0.9193 1.4826 0.8613 1.5144 0.7716 1.3592
σ11 0.0634 0.0637 0.0631 0.0634 0.0632 0.0635 0.0631 0.0633
σ22 0.0126 0.0126 0.0126 0.0126 0.0126 0.0126 0.0126 0.0126
σ33 0.0315 0.0314 0.0315 0.0316 0.0315 0.0314 0.0315 0.0314
σ44 0.0554 0.0553 0.0556 0.0557 0.0554 0.0555 0.0554 0.0554
θ
P
1 0.0421 0.0428 0.0413 0.0411 0.0423 0.0423 0.0422 0.0420
θ
P
2 -0.0110 -0.0126 -0.0095 -0.0103 -0.0102 -0.0081 -0.0131 -0.0132
θ
P
3 -0.0065 -0.0062 -0.0067 -0.0047 -0.0085 -0.0062 -0.0087 -0.0098
θ
P
4 0.0148 0.0145 0.0151 0.0152 0.0147 0.0143 0.0152 0.0145
λ 0.5980 0.5979 0.5981 0.5981 0.5979 0.5980 0.5979 0.5982
α
R 0.3860 0.3874 0.3847 0.3846 0.3861 0.3828 0.3893 0.3860
θ
Q
1 32,600 32,683 32,517 32,634 32,484 32,623 32,461 32,585
θ
Q
4 15,368 15,341 15,396 15,511 15,253 15,398 15,223 15,367
σ
N
ε (3m) 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020
σ
N
ε (6m) 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
σ
N
ε (1yr) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
σ
N
ε (2yr) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
σ
N
ε (3yr) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
σ
N
ε (5yr) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
σ
N
ε (7yr) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
σ
N
ε (10yr) 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
σ
R
ε (5yr) 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018
σ
R
ε (6yr) 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011
σ
R
ε (7yr) 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
σ
R
ε (8yr) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
σ
R
ε (9yr) 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
σ
R
ε (10yr) 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
Table 8: Summary Statistics of the Finite-Sample Bias Correction Assuming No
Liquidity Correction of TIPS Yields.
The table reports the summary statistics of the ﬁrst four steps of the ﬁnite-sample bias correction of
the CLR model with no liquidity correction of TIPS yields. The results of each step of the algorithm
is based on N = 100 simulated data sets identical to the original data sample.
isfy all non-negativity requirements, so the “true” underlying continuous-time process never becomes negative
P-a.s. However, for the discretely observed process above there is always a positive, but usually very small,
probability that the approximation will become negative. Whenever this happens, we truncate the simulated
square-root processes at 0 similar to what we do in the model estimations.
As for the starting point, X0, of the simulation algorithm, we ideally want to draw it from the uncon-
ditional joint distribution of the state variables. However, due to the non-Gaussian property of the model,
the unconditional distribution of the state variables is unknown. We overcome this problem by taking the
estimated value of the state variables at the end of the observed bond yield sample and simulate the state
variables according to the algorithm above for 100 years and repeat this N = 100 times. This eﬀectively gives
us random draws from the joint unconditional distribution of Xt.






Estimate Median Value Median Value Median Value Median
κ
P
11 0.8707 0.9421 0.7992 0.9961 0.6738 0.8599 0.6846 0.8291
κ
P
22 0.5858 0.6994 0.4723 0.5586 0.4995 0.6584 0.4270 0.5440
κ
P
23 -0.5610 -0.5633 -0.5586 -0.6232 -0.4964 -0.5223 -0.5351 -0.5626
κ
P
33 0.7531 0.9153 0.5909 0.7877 0.5563 0.7573 0.5520 0.7764
κ
P
44 2.1022 2.6977 1.5067 2.0320 1.5769 2.0197 1.6594 1.9662
σ11 0.0574 0.0575 0.0572 0.0575 0.0571 0.0574 0.0571 0.0572
σ22 0.0122 0.0122 0.0122 0.0122 0.0122 0.0122 0.0122 0.0122
σ33 0.0320 0.0319 0.0320 0.0320 0.0320 0.0319 0.0321 0.0319
σ44 0.0609 0.0609 0.0610 0.0612 0.0608 0.0609 0.0608 0.0606
θ
P
1 0.0436 0.0434 0.0437 0.0432 0.0440 0.0437 0.0439 0.0425
θ
P
2 -0.0124 -0.0112 -0.0136 -0.0110 -0.0149 -0.0138 -0.0135 -0.0154
θ
P
3 -0.0074 -0.0059 -0.0089 -0.0065 -0.0097 -0.0085 -0.0086 -0.0102
θ
P
4 0.0129 0.0130 0.0128 0.0129 0.0128 0.0126 0.0131 0.0127
λ 0.5937 0.5935 0.5940 0.5942 0.5935 0.5932 0.5940 0.5940
α
R 0.5890 0.5905 0.5875 0.5839 0.5925 0.5890 0.5925 0.5883
θ
Q
1 30,120 30,146 30,094 30,226 29,988 30,114 29,995 30,033
θ
Q
4 18,559 18,545 18,574 18,758 18,375 18,589 18,345 18,412
σ
N
ε (3m) 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0019 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0019
σ
N
ε (6m) 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
σ
N
ε (1yr) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
σ
N
ε (2yr) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
σ
N
ε (3yr) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
σ
N
ε (5yr) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
σ
N
ε (7yr) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
σ
N
ε (10yr) 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
σ
R
ε (5yr) 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015
σ
R
ε (6yr) 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
σ
R
ε (7yr) 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
σ
R
ε (8yr) 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
σ
R
ε (9yr) 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
σ
R
ε (10yr) 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
Table 9: Summary Statistics of the Finite-Sample Bias Correction Assuming the
Maximum Liquidity Correction of TIPS Yields.
The table reports the summary statistics of the ﬁrst four steps of the ﬁnite-sample bias correction of
the CLR model with maximum liquidity correction of TIPS yields. The results of each step of the
algorithm is based on N = 100 simulated data sets identical to the original data sample.
estimation based on the observed data by ψ1. In the ﬁrst step of the bias correction algorithm, we use ψ1 to
simulate the model as described above. The median of the N = 100 estimation results from the simulated
data is denoted med(ψ1). As a result, the initial bias is given by
bias(ψ1) = med(ψ1) − ψ1.
To determine the parameter set to be used in the second step of the algorithm, we assume that the shape
of the bias function for each parameter is approximately linear, monotonically increasing, and independent of
all other model parameters. As a consequence, the best guess of the bias-corrected parameter set given the
information available from the ﬁrst step is
ψ2 = ψ1 − bias(ψ1).
32No TIPS liquidity premium Maximum TIPS liquidity premium Parameter
Estimate Bias corrected Median Estimate Bias corrected Median
κ
P
11 1.0188 0.7735 1.0748 0.8707 0.6846 0.8291
κ
P
22 0.6073 0.5016 0.6076 0.5858 0.4270 0.5440
κ
P
23 -0.5678 -0.5456 -0.5919 -0.5610 -0.5351 -0.5626
κ
P
33 0.7530 0.5672 0.7958 0.7531 0.5520 0.7764
κ
P
44 1.4246 0.7716 1.3592 2.1022 1.6594 1.9662
σ11 0.0634 0.0631 0.0633 0.0574 0.0571 0.0572
σ22 0.0126 0.0126 0.0126 0.0122 0.0122 0.0122
σ33 0.0315 0.0315 0.0314 0.0320 0.0321 0.0319
σ44 0.0554 0.0554 0.0554 0.0609 0.0608 0.0606
θ
P
1 0.0421 0.0422 0.0420 0.0436 0.0439 0.0425
θ
P
2 -0.0110 -0.0131 -0.0132 -0.0124 -0.0135 -0.0154
θ
P
3 -0.0065 -0.0087 -0.0098 -0.0074 -0.0086 -0.0102
θ
P
4 0.0148 0.0152 0.0145 0.0129 0.0131 0.0127
λ 0.5980 0.5979 0.5982 0.5937 0.5940 0.5940
α
R 0.3860 0.3893 0.3860 0.5890 0.5925 0.5883
θ
Q
1 32,600 32,461 32,585 30,120 29,995 30,033
θ
Q
4 15,368 15,223 15,367 18,559 18,345 18,412
σ
N
ε (3m) 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0019
σ
N
ε (6m) 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
σ
N
ε (1yr) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
σ
N
ε (2yr) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
σ
N
ε (3yr) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
σ
N
ε (5yr) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
σ
N
ε (7yr) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
σ
N
ε (10yr) 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
σ
R
ε (5yr) 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015
σ
R
ε (6yr) 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
σ
R
ε (7yr) 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
σ
R
ε (8yr) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
σ
R
ε (9yr) 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
σ
R
ε (10yr) 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
Table 10: Finite-Sample Bias-Corrected Parameter Estimates.
The table reports the summary statistics of the fourth step of the ﬁnite-sample bias correction of
the CLR model, ﬁrst assuming no liquidity correction of TIPS yields, second assuming the maximum
liquidity correction of TIPS yields. In each case, the results are based on N = 100 simulated data sets
identical to the original data sample in each step of the bias correction algorithm.
Now, ψ2 is used in the simulation of the model and everything is repeated. In general, after step i, the
remaining bias is
bias(ψi) = med(ψi) − ψ1,
and the parameter set to be used in step i + 1 is
ψi+1 = ψi − bias(ψi).
This algorithm is continued until a satisfactory level of accuracy is obtained. In terms of determining the
stopping point, it should be kept in mind that there is an unavoidable base level of uncertainty inherent in
the bias correction tied to the structure of the observed data as well as the number of simulations. Here,
we choose to stop the bias-correction algorithm after the fourth step as the remaining bias is within the











































































































































































Figure 7: Variation in Medians of Estimated KP Parameters.
Illustration of the medians of estimated parameters in the KP matrix in the CLR model from subsam-
ples containing 100 parameter estimates each (1-100, 101-200 etc.) out of a total of 1,000 parameter
estimates from simulated data as described in the text. In each chart, the solid grey line indicates the
median of all 1,000 estimates.
base level uncertainty. The results of the ﬁrst four steps of the bias correction for the case where no TIPS
liquidity premiums are assumed are reported in Table 8, while the corresponding results for the case where
the maximum TIPS liquidity premiums are assumed are reported in Table 9. Finally, the summary result of
the bias correction with the bias-corrected parameter sets are reported in Table 10.
To illustrate the inherent base uncertainty in the median-based bias correction we employ in this paper,
we simulate N = 1,000 artiﬁcial samples based on the “true” parameters from the observed data for the case
34where no TIPS liquidity premiums are assumed. Using the simulated data in model estimations, gives us a
total of N = 1,000 alternative parameter sets that we split into 10 subgroups each containing 100 parameter
sets (1-100, 101-200 etc.). Now, we calculate the median estimates of each parameter from the ten subgroups
and compare them to the median of all N = 1,000 parameter estimates. The result is shown in Figure 7 for the
four parameters in the diagonal of K
P that are most severely aﬀected by the ﬁnite-sample bias. The important
thing to note is that there is a tradeoﬀ between accuracy and computation time to be made when choosing
the number of simulations to use in the bias correction, and 100 simulations in each iteration appear suﬃcient
as the median is not that sensitive to the number of simulations.
33 Also, in light of the statistical uncertainty
of the parameter estimates we obtain from the observed data, we think that N = 100 strikes a reasonable
balance in terms of the tradeoﬀ. Importantly, we do not want to leave the impression that the bias-corrected
parameters are estimated with greater accuracy than the “true” parameters we get from the data.
33This diﬀers from situations where the tails of each parameter distribution are of interest, say, for the
generation of conﬁdence bands. In those cases, a thousand or more simulations could be required to reach an
adequate level of accuracy.
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